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for minority shareholders against a short form merger it should be for-
mulated by a legislative or an administrative body taking all the rele-
vant and unique considerations into account, 72 not by courts seeking
to apply rule 1Ob-5 to an area with which it was never intended to deal,
in a misguided effort to provide needed protection for minority share-
holders.
JOHNNY REID EDWARDS
Truth in Lending-Failure To Disclose a Right of Acceleration
Held Not a Violation
The Truth in Lending Act' and Federal Reserve Board Regula-
tion Z2 provide, inter alia, that a creditor shall disclose to its customers
any "default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of
late payments."'  Confronted with the issue whether a contractual
right to accelerate total indebtedness is such a charge when state law
requires a rebate of the unearned portion of the finance charge, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman
in their good judgment may discern and apply. We will then have in the
securities field our own Erie v. Tompkins.
Borden, supra note 1, at 1039 (footnotes omitted). This argument is relied upon
heavily by defendants in Green in their petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 11, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. V. Green,
533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3222 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
72. It should be noted that the SEC has drafted proposed rules that would deal
specifically with the application of rule lOb-5 to the types of situations discussed herein.
If SEC rules are to be applied to these situations at all, it would certainly appear
that the better route would be through the Commission's proposed rules. Two of
these rules basically place disclosure requirements and substantive limitation on those
planning to carry out trdnsactions that would result in "going private." Proposed Rules
13e-3A & 13e-3B, Securities Act Release No. 5507 (Feb. 6, 1975), reprinted in [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RE. (CCH) 80,104, at 85,091-93.
1. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667 (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamplet
No. 2, pt. 1 1976). The Truth in Lending Act is subchapter I of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1691 (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976 &
Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
2. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1976). Regulation Z was promulgated by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System pursuant to the authority granted by 15 U.S.C.
§ 1604 (1970). The Board's authority is designed to insure the effectiveness of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc.,
411 U.S. 356 (1973).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (9) (1970); 12 C.FR. § 226.8(b)(4) (1976).
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Ford, Inc.4 recently held that the right of acceleration is not a "charge"
and that disclosure of the acceleration right is not mandated by section
128(a)(9) of the Truth in Lending Act5 and section 226.8(b)(4)
of Regulation Z.
The McCrackin-Sturman case arose out of a commonplace con-
sumer transaction-financing the purchase of a used automobile through
an installment loan contract.7  The .contract, executed on January 20,
1973 by plaintiffs William and Joan Johnson, was originated by Mc-
Crackin-Sturman Ford, Inc. and assigned to Ford Motor Credit Com-
pany.8 Paragraph 20 of the contract contained a "time is of the essence"
clause that specified the lender's right of acceleration upon borrow-
er's faultY A disclosure statement and a copy of the contract were
delivered to plaintiffs at the time of sale. The disclosure statement
provided information about certain terms of the contract, including
the amount of the charges assessable in the event of late payments".
4. 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975).
5. Section 128(a) (9) provides: "(a) In connection with each consumer credit
sale not under an open end credit plan, the creditor shall disclose each of the following
items which is applicable: . . . (9) The default, delinquency, or similar charges pay-
able in the event of late payments." 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (9) (1970).
6. Section 226.8(b)(4) provides: "(b) Disclosures in sale and nonsale credit.
In any transaction subject to this section, the following items, as applicable, shall be
disclosed: . .. (4) The amount, or method of computing the amount of any default,
delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of late payments." 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.8(b) (4) (1976).
7. Not all extensions of credit are covered by the Truth in Lending laws. Ex-
empted transactions are set forth in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp.
1976).
8. Section 115 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act sets forth the following
provision concerning the liability of assignees:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this subehapter, any civil"
action for a violation of this subehapter which may be brought against the
original creditor in any credit transaction may be maintained against any
subsequent assignee of the original creditor where the violation from which
the alleged liability arose is apparent on the face of the instrument assigned
unless the assignment is involuntary.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1614 (West Cum. Supp. 1976).
9. Paragraph 20 of the contract provided as follows:
20. DEFAULT
Time is of the essence of this contract. In the event Buyer defaults in any
payment, or fails to obtain or maintain the insurance required hereunder,
or fails to comply with any other provision hereof, or a proceeding in bank-
ruptcy, receivership or insolvency shall be instituted by or against Buyer or
his property, or Seller deems the Property in danger of misuse or confiscation,
Seller shall have the right to declare all amounts due or tb become due here-
under to be immediately due and payable. ...
527 F.2d at 261 (emphasis by the court).
10. The provision disclosing delinquency charges stated:
(13) Delinquency charges: Buyer may be required to pay a delinquency
charge of 2% of any installment in default for each month, or fraction
thereof in excess of 10 days, that such installment is in default, plus such
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and the method of computing the rebate of the unearned finance
charge unon prepayment of the loan," but the statement did not pro-
vide any information about the creditor's right to accelerate payment.
When plaintiffs defaulted in payment on the contract,12 Ford Motor
Credit exercised its rights under paragraph 20 of the contract and
repossessed the automobile.
Alleging that the disclosure statement that they received did not
meet the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z,
plaintiffs, in June 1973, sought statutory damages' 3 against Mc-
Crackin-Sturman Ford, Inc. and Ford Motor Credit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.14 The
expenses incurred -by the seller in effecting collection under the Contract
as may be allowed by law.
Id. at 261 n.4.
11. Paragraph 15 of the contract set forth the rebate provision:
(15) Prepayment rebate: Buyer may prepay his obligations under the
Contract in full at any time prior to maturity of the final installment there-
under, and if he does so, shall receive a rebate of the unearned portion of
the Finance Charge computed under the sum of the digits method subject
to retention by the Seller of a minimum finance charge of $10.00. No rebate
will be made if the amount is less than $1.00.
Id. at 261 n.5.
12. Plaintiffs failed to make any payments under the contract. Id. at 261.
13. Section 130 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act sets forth the damages
awardable for Truth in Lending violations. In pertinent part the section provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails
to comply with any requirement imposed under this part or part D or E
of this subchaptpr with respect to any person is liable to such person in
an amount equal to the sum of-
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the
failure;
(2) (A) i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of
any finance charge in connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the
case of an individual action relating to a consumer lease under part E
of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total amount of monthly pay-
ments under the lease, except that the liability under this subparagraph
shall not be tess than $100 nor greater than $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may
allow, except as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall
be applicable and the total recovery in such action shall not be more
than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the
creditor; and(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing
liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's
fee as determined by the court.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1640 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
14. Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 153, 156 (W.D. Pa.
1974). In the district court all parties had moved for summary judgment. The mo-
tions by McCrackin-Sturman Ford and Ford Motor Credit were denied; the motion
by plaintiffs was granted against McCrackin-Sturman Ford alone. Plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment against Ford Motor Credit, however, was denied without preju-
dice. Id. The court noted that in the event that plaintiffs were unable to collect
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court held that a right of acceleration was a "default, delinquency,
or similar charge" within the purview of section 128(a)(9) of the
Truth in Lending Act and section 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z.15
In failing to disclose the right of acceleration, the court reasoned that
defendant had not made precisely -the "type of disclosure that the
Truth-in-Lending Act was intended to require."1  Allegations of
other violations of the Act were not considered in the summary judg-
ment order.
On appeal of the summary judgment order against McCrackin-Stur-
man,' 7 the Third Circuit reversed, holding that when state law re-
quires that the creditor rebate the unearned portion of the finance
charge,' 8 the right of acceleration is not a "default, delinquency, or
similar charge."' 9  Rather the court characterized the right as a con-
tractual remedy,20 and thus determined disclosure was not required by
section 128(a)(9) of the Truth in Lending Act and section 226.8
(b)(4) of Regulation Z.21  The court emphasized that it was not
confronted with the issue whether a right of acceleration need be dis-
closed when there is no requirement that the creditor rebate the un-
earned portion of the finance charge.22
The Third Circuit rejected the district court's determination that
a "charge" was simply an "obligation."2  Characterizing its own def-
inition of the word as the meaning utilized by the consumer credit
industry, the Third Circuit defined "charge" as a specific pecuniary
sum assessed in addition to the regular payments. 24  Since Penn-
from McCrackin-Sturman, they would need to produce additional evidence to hold Ford
Motor credit liable. Id. See note 8 supra for statutory provisions on the liability
of assignees. Only the ruling against McCrackin-Sturman Ford was certified as an
appealable final judgment pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 527 F.2d at 262.
15. 381 F. Supp. at 156.
16. Id.
17. See note 14 supra.
18. The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act provides in pertinent part:
Whenever all the time balance is liquidated prior to maturity by pre-
payment, refinancing or termination by surrender or repossession and re-sale
of the motor vehicle, the holder of the installment sale contract shall rebate
to the buyer immediately the unearned portion of the finance charge. Rebate
may be made in cash or credited to the amount due on the obligation of
the buyer.:
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 622(B) (Purdon 1965).
19. 527 F.2d at 265.
20. Id. at 267.
21. Id. at 266-67.
22. Id. at 260 n.3.
23. Id. at 265.
24. Id. at 266.
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sylvania law, which the court held was fully incorporated into the
contract,25 requires a rebate of any unearned finance charge upon ac-
celeration,2" the court reasoned that no pecuniary sum in addition to
the existing contractual obligation was being assessed.27  Thus, there
was no requirement that the right of acceleration be disclosed as a "de-
fault, delinquency, or similar charge." In reaching this conclusion
the Third Circuit relied heavily on a Federal Reserve Board staff opin-
ion letter,2 issued subsequent to the district court decision, that
also concluded that a right of acceleration was not disclosable as a
charge when there was a requirement that unearned interest be re-
bated.29 The court rejected the contention that it should not con-
sider Pennsylvania's statutory rebate provisions and that, by merely set-
ting forth in the contract a right to accelerate total indebtedness, de-
fendants had violated the disclosure requirements. 30  The court also
rejected the argument that the "meaningful disclosure" standard of
the Truth in Lending laws required a right of acceleration to be dis-
closed."'
The legislative intent and text of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act32 provide a backdrop against -which the McCrackin-Sturman de-
cision may be viewed. Enacted in 1968, the Act was developed to
provide the consumer with meaningful information in order that he
might intelligently "shop around" for credit sources.3  Intended ef-
fects of the legislation included enhancement of economic stabiliza-
tion and strengthening of competition among the various financial in-
stitutions. 4 Consumers litigating under the Truth in Lending laws
"25. Id.; see text following note 69 infra.
26. PA. STAT. Am. tit. 69, § 622(B) (Purdon 1965), set forth in note 18 supra.
27. 527 F.2d at 266.
28. 5 CoNs. CP.D. GuiDE (CCH) f 31,173 (1974), quoted in 527 F.2d at 267
n.22.
29. 527 F.2d at 267.
30. Id. at 268.
31. Id. at 269.
32. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1691 (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamphlet
No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
33. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 364 (1973); 12
C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (2) (1976) (FRB statement of purpose of Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act); [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962 (legislative history of Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act-House Report and Conference Report). See generally
Boyd, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act-A Consumer Perspective, 45
NOTRE DAME LAw. 171 (1970).
-34. -15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). This section also states that the purpose of the
legislation was to assure a-meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer
could compare the various credit terms available and thereby avoid the uninformed
use of credit. Id. Currently within the purview of the legislation are credit billing
[Vol. 55
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have generally found the provisions construed liberally in order to
foster the remedial purposes of the legislation."5
Prior to the McCrackin-Sturman district court decision, the issue
whether a creditor must disclose a right to accelerate had confronted
the courts only in the class action of Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs,
Inc.36 In that case defendant had failed to disclose his right to accel-
erate the entire balance of the contract. Although the theory of re-
covery stated in the complaint was defective, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois found on its own initia-
tive a violation of the requirement of section 226.8(b)(4) of Regu-
lation Z that requires a lender to disclose "charges payable in the
event of late payments. 's7  The court reflected on the informative
purposes of the consumer credit statutes and held that it was clear
that an acceleration of indebtedness provision should be disclosed as
a "default, delinquency, or similar charge" within the meaning of sec-
ti6ns 128(a)(9) of the Truth in Lending Act and 226.8(b)(4) of Regu-
lation Z.38 Relying on Black's Law Dictionary, the court adopted
"obligation" and "claim" as synonyms for "charge. '39  The court
also concluded that "charge" had been judicially defined as "a
pecuniary burden or expense."'40 These definitions, later accepted
by the district court in McCrackin-Sturman, were the gravamen of the
holding in Garza that a right of acceleration was a disclosable
"charge.-"41
Subsequent to the McCrackin-Sturman district court decision with
its treatment of Garza as authoritative on the acceleration disclosure
issue,42 but prior to the Third Circuit's decision in the case, numerous
opportunities to consider the matter further were presented at the-dis-
trict court level. The first encounter with the issue was 'by a special
master for the United States District Court for the Northern District
practices, credit card transactions and consumer leases. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (West
Cam. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 11976).
35. See, e.g., Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 748 (5th
Cir. 1973); Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. Ore. 1975); John-
son v. Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121, 1122 (S.D. 11L 1974). But see Jones
v. East Hills Ford Sales, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 402, 403 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
36. 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. III. 1972).
37. Id. at 959.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 153, 156 (W.D. Pa.
1974).
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of Georgia. In Pollack v. Avco Financial Services, Inc.,43 and Barks-
dale v. Peoples Financial Corp.4 the same special master followed
Garza and the district court McCrackin-Sturman opinion in concluding
that a right of acceleration was a charge that required disclosure.
Barksdale is representative of this reasoning in which the master, after
noting the absence of any special meaning or legislative definition for
the word "charge," reported "[a]s a matter of law that a right of ac-
celeration is a 'charge' that must be disclosed pursuant to Regulation
Z § 226.8 (b) (4)."'4
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia further
considered disclosure of acceleration clauses in the case of McDaniel
v. Fulton National Bank .4  In McDaniel the court adopted the find-
ings of the special master47 and developed a line of reasoning different
from that of the earlier cases. Making observations about the general
nature of "charges" as evidenced by sections 226.4(a) and 226.8(c)
or Regulation Z,48 the master had determined that the term "charges"
referred to specific pecuniary sums that could be assessed against the
customer in addition to the existing contractual obligations. 49  He con-
cluded "that the right of the creditor, upon default of the debtor, to
43. 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) If 98,766 (1974).
44. Id. 98,738.
45. Id. at 88,341. Although a report by the same master in Hall v. Sheraton
Galleries, id. 1 98,737, was issued prior to the district court McCrackn-Sturmnan deci-
sion, the report cited Garza and concluded that a provision for collection of attorneys'
fees and acceleration of indebtedness in the event of default was disclosable as a charge
that may be imposed against the borrowing of money. Id. at 88,336.
46. 395 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
47. Id. at 423. The master's findings are reported in McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l
Bank, 5 CONS. GCRD. GUIDE (CCH) I 98,683, at 88,263 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
48. Language in § 226.4(a) of Regulation Z is representative of that from which
these observations were drawn. Charges required by this section to be included in
the determination of finance charges are of the following types:
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under a
discount or other system of additional charges.
(2) Service, transaction, activity or carrying charge.
(3) Loan fee, points, finder's fee, or similar charge.
(4) Fee for an appraisal, investigation, or credit~report.
(5) Charge or premiums for credit life, accident, health, or loss of in-
come insurance, written in connection with any credit transaction ....(6) Charges or premiums for insurance, written in connection with any
credit transaction, against loss of or damage to property or against liability
arising out of the ownership or use of property ....(7) Premium or other charge for any other guarantee or insurance pro-
tecting the creditor against the customer's default gr other credit loss.
(8) Any charge imposed by a creditor upon another creditor for pur-
chasing or accepting an obligation of a customer if the customer is required
to pay any part of that charge in cash, as an addition to the obligation,
or as a deduction from the proceeds of the obligation.
12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1976).
49. 5 CoNs. CRED. Gum f 98,683, at 88,263.
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accelerate the unpaid balance, cannot reasonably be considered a
'charge' (expense or cost) in any context inasmuch as acceleration, in
and of itself, does not increase the amount of the debt by one penny."5
Coupling the master's findings with its interpretation that Georgia law
prohibited the collection of any unearned interest,5 the district court
determined that there was no need to disclose an acceleration provision
as a "default, delinquency, or similar charge" since no additional tangible
sum could be assessed.5 2  Garza and the McCrackin-Sturman district
court opinion were not considered valid precedent in McDaniel because
the court read those cases as not involving a prohibition on the collection
of unearned interest such as that which the court interpreted Georgia
law to require.5
In Barrett v. Vernie Jones Ford, Inc.,54 which also arose in the
Northern District of Georgia, Chief Judge Edenfield pointed out that
the court in McDaniel was in error in its interpretation of the Georgia
law regarding collection of unearned interest.55 The Georgia law,
stated in Vernie Jones, was that an acceleration of total indebtedness
clause was unenforceable only if it rendered the contract usurious."
When it considered the disclosure ramifications of a potentially en-
forceable acceleration clause, the Vernie Jones court concluded that,
if a note "made no provision for rebate of unearned interest upon ac-
celeration, the diminution of the period over which the finance charge
would be spread"'57 would constitute a default charge to the consumer.
In requiring disclosure of clauses that on their face provided for an
acceleration of total indebtedness, the Vernie Jones court grounded
its decision on a determination that congressional intent required that
the consumer be made aware of all "charges" that might be assessed
against him.5 8  Whether -the consumer would prevail in any subse-
quent litigation attacking the validity of the charge was not the focus
-of the inquiry. A supplemental opinion in McDaniel v. Fulton Na-
tional Bank acknowledged the correct interpretation of Georgia law
in the Vernie Jones case.5 9
50. Id. at 88,264.
51. 395 F. Supp. at 423.
52. Id. at 426.
53. Id. at 423.
54. 395 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
55. Id. at 907.
56. Id. at 907-08.
57. Id. at 907.
58. Id. at 908-09.
59. See 395 F. Supp. at 425. The supplemental opinion reversed the court's prior
1977]
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Other district courts have utilized policy arguments in the decis-
ion to require disclosure of acceleration clauses. Meyers v. Clearview
Dodge Sales, Inc.60 required disclosure of a right of acceleration even
though Louisiana law had provisions for a rebate of unearned. interest.
The court reasoned that disclosure of the right of acceleration fur-
thered important goals of the Truth in Lending laws."1 Citing Garza
v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc.,6 2 Meyers viewed a "charge" as .any pe-
cuniary burden or obligation.68 Woods v. Beneficial Finance Co.,"
noting Meyers with approval, referred to a meaningful disclosure
standard under the spirit of the Truth in Lending laws. 6  Woods did,
however, acknowledge that fine semantic distinctions were necessary
to equate "acceleration" with "charge. 66
Since it has been held axiomatic to judicial review that an admin-
istrative agency's interpretations of its own regulations are entitled to
great deference by the courts,67 it is hardly open to question that the
Third Circuit properly relied on the Federal Reserve Board staff opin-
ion letter that clearly interpreted "default, delinquency, or similar
charges" not to include a right of acceleration when there is a'require-
position and required a disclosure of the right to accelerate total indebtedness. Id.
at 428. The opinion now reasoned that the congressional intent behind constimer
credit legislation required disclosure of all charges that the lender asserts that he has
a right to collect. Id. As in Vernie Jones, whether or not .the state courts could
be utilized to collect the charge was not a determinative issue. Id.
Prior to the supplemental opinion in McDaniel, the district court in Barksdale
v. Peoples Fin., 393 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1975), in reliance on the initial McDan-
iel opinion, overruled the special master's recommendation that the right of acceleration
be disclosed as a "charge." Id. at 114. The court, following the incorrect conclusion
in McDaniel that acceleration of total indebtedness clauses were per se unenforceable
in Georgia, held that since no additional sums could possibly be assessed against the
borrower there was no "charge" to disclose. Id. at 114.
60. 384 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1974).
61. Id. at 726-27.
62. 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Il. 1972), cited in 384 F. Supp. at 726-27.
63. 384 F. Supp. at 726-27.
64. 395 F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1975).
65. Id. at 16.
66. Id. In light of these distinctions, Woods held prospectively that it was neces-
sary that rights of acceleration be disclosed. Id. One district court case that did
not require disclosure of the right to accelerate was Jones v. East Hills Ford Sales,
Inc., 398 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Pa. 1975). This case was decided by another judge
of the same district court that had required disclosure in McCrackin-Sturnan. The
Jones court, as did the Third Circuit in its disposition of McCrackin-Sturman, 527
F.2d at 267, afforded great weight to the Federal Reserve Board staff opinion letter
(cited in note 28 supra), which made it clear that it was not necessary to disclose
a right of acceleration as a charge when a rebate of unearned interest was required.
398 F. Supp. at 404. Interestingly, the Jones court did not refer to the Pennsylvania
statutory rebate requirements. The court concluded that the rebate policy of the cred-
itor involved sufficiently. obviated the claim that the customer was being charged. Id.
67.. Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261, 265 (Sth
[Vol. 55
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ment that unearned interest be rebated." Acceptance of this Fed-
eral Reserve Board position also necessarily required departure
from the determination of Garza and its progeny that a charge is
simply an "obligation" or "burden" rather than a specific additional
pecuniary sum. 69 The surprising part of the McCrackin-Sturman
opinion is its decision to incorporate the Pennsylvania rebate provision
into the loan contract. To incorporate the Pennsylvania statute, the
Third Circuit relied on the famous language of Von Hoffman v. City
of Quincy: "It is also settled that the laws which subsist at the time
and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be per-
formed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly re-
ferred to or incorporated in its terms. ' 70  Reflecting on this quotation,
Professor Corbin has reasoned that the general terminology of such
a statement precluded it from being accepted as. correct. 71  He ac-
knowledged that the operation of a contract could only be determined
with due reference to all applicable statutes but emphatically stated
that the statutes were not incorporated into the contract.7 2
At first blush it seems that with proper reference to the historical
interpretation and purpose of consumer credit laws, the Third Circuit
should have disregarded Von Hoffman and concluded that the accel-
eration clause should have been disclosed since on its face it created
a charge, albeit an unenforceable one under Pennsylvania law.. The
court would have been supported in such a decision by the prior de-
termination in Vernie Jones that a rebate provision should not be read
into a silent acceleration clause. 73 A pro-disclosure opinion would
also have been consistent with the general philosophy of consumer
credit legislation.74 Ironically, it was the consumer oriented Penn-
Cir. 1971); see Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Bone v. Hibernia Bank,
493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974); N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
68. 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) If 31,173 (1974), quoted in 527 F.2d at 267 n.22.
69. See, e.g., Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722, 726-
27 (E.D. La. 1974); Pollack v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 5 CONS. CRED. GuIE (CCH)
1 98,766 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (special master's report). For a discussion of the term
"charge," see Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) V 98,568 (N.D.
Ga. 1975); McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 11 98,683
(N.D. Ga. 1974) (special master's report). See also 1 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
. 4230 (1970) (definition of delinquency charge).
70. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535,.550 (1886).
71. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 551, at 197 (1960).
72. Id.
73. 395 F. Supp. 904, 909 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
74. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973).
See generally Boyd, supra note 33, at 174.
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sylvania statute that allowed the Third Circuit to deviate from the
"meaningful disclosure" standard that had often mandated disclosures
in prior Truth in Lending cases.75
Under Georgia law, as interpreted in Vernie Jones, acceleration of
total indebtedness clauses are not per se unenforceable. 7 That court
refused to read a rebate requirement into a silent clause because there
was no certainty that a rebate would be required. A rebate of unearned
interest was called for only if acceleration rendered the note usurious. 77
The Pennsylvania statute involved in McCrackin-Sturman is an un-
equivocal rebate requirement. 78 If the Third Circuit had interpreted the
contractual right to accelerate total indebtedness as a disclosable
"charge," the court would have been in the awkward position of requiring
Pennsylvania lenders to disclose to their customers that the lender was
asserting a right to a "charge" that a state statute made it impossible
lawfully to collect. Thus, in the specific factual context of McCrackin-
Sturman, the decision not to require disclosure of the acceleration clause
was the practical resolution of the issue. However, the incorporation
of the Pennslyvania statute into the contract does raise a broad collateral
problem concerning the extent to which state law provisions may per-
meate a Truth in Lending case.79
Although there is nothing really profound in the conclusion that
an acceleration clause does not constitute a "default, delinquency, or
similar charge" when there is a provision for rebate of any unearned
interest, there is a certain gravity to a decision that disclosure of such
a clause will not be required under the Truth in Lending laws. In
its decision not to grasp "meaningful disclosure" as the sustaining phi-
losophy of what would have been a technically weak position, the
Third Circuit appropriately indicated that the standard of meaningful
disclosure should not override the specific provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act and Regulation Z. But since the opinion inevitably sur-
faces with an anti-consumer gloss, it is likely that Johnson v. McCrac-
kin-Sturman Ford, Inc. will be viewed as a deviation from the direction
that the courts have determined that consumer credit litigation must take.,
75. See, e.g., Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. Ore. 1975);
Johnson v. Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121, 1122 (S.D. Ill. 1974).
76. 395 F. Supp. at 909.
77. Id. at 910.
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 622(B) (Purdon 1965). See note 18 supra for the
provisions of the statute.
79. See McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 395 F. Supp. 422, 428 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
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After a thorough consideration of the Third Circuit's opinion in Mc-
Crackin-Sturman, a district court recently concluded:
[Elven if we accept the argument that acceleration of the defaulted
loan does not impose a charge under 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) (4),
the customer should be informed of the right of acceleration and
its consequences under the requirement that there be a meaning-
ful disclosure of the terms and conditions of the credit transaction
80
Thus, even though it is a well reasoned opinion, Johnson v. McCrackin-
Sturman Ford, Inc. does not seem destined for the authoritative treat-
ment it deserves.
THoMs C. WATKINS
80. Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 733, 781 (W.D. La. 1976) (supple-
mental opinion).

